Comments
 | Does Economic Performance Correlate with Big Government?
Peter Gordon and Lanlan Wang
Volume 1, Number 2, August 2004 Development is a systemic evolution that is not limited to the improvement of economic performance per se. It also requires and prompts improvement of political institutions and performance of public sectors. Inspired by the La Porta et al. discussion, results shown here—which, contrary to La Porta et al., find no effect on economic development from the size of government—represent an effort to identify simultaneous relationships between three variables, Political Institutions, Scope of Public Sector, and Economic Development.
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 | Kuznets Curveball: Missing the Regional Strike Zone
Jeff Edwards and Anya McGuirk
Volume 1, Number 2, August 2004 The objective of this paper is to emphasize the need for adhering to the standard normal and identically distributed (NID) assumptions that are the basis of proper statistical inference in Ordinary Least Squares econometric models. The testing of and adherence to these assumptions are particularly important with small samples. In this paper we offer a statistical critique of a study by Chang and Ram (2000). The inferences they draw from their models are incorrect because of a violation of the assumption of identically distributed errors.
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| | Response to Edwards and McGuirk
Jih Y. Chang and Rati Ram
Volume 1, Number 2, August 2004 The estimates of Edwards and McGuirk's own specification generate a picture of predicted income-inequality profiles that is remarkably similar to that shown by Chang and Ram (2000) and is very different from the profiles displayed in the Comment, profiles which are inaccurate relative to Edwards and McGuirk’s own specification. Therefore, nothing in Edwards and McGuirk’s Comment alters the Chang-Ram conclusion that at any income level a high-growth economy is likely to experience smaller inequality than a low-growth country.
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| | Reply to Chang and Ram
Jeff Edwards and Anya McGuirk
Volume 1, Number 2, August 2004 We consider what, if anything, Chang and Ram could conclude even if their analysis were statistically justified. A simple look at some confidence intervals indicates that nothing at all can be concluded regarding the differences found in the inequality-income profiles of high- and low-growth countries. The model we ultimately propose based on statistical grounds also finds no statistically significant differences between high- and low-growth countries.
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| | Statist Quo Bias
Daniel B. Klein
Volume 1, Number 2, August 2004 The immediate problem with Thaler and Sunstein's "Libertarian Paternalism" is the fatuity of its declared motivation. But a careful reading detects a deeper problem. It is likely that the authors wish to reject the distinction between voluntary and coercive action upon which the very idea of libertarianism is based.
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 | Response to Klein
Cass R. Sunstein
Volume 1, Number 2, August 2004 As far as I can see, Daniel Klein (2004) has no quarrel with libertarian paternalism. He suggests that Richard Thaler and I are focused on cafeteria design rather than policy issues. But as Klein knows, we refer to many policy issues, including employee savings, consumer protection, social security reform, and employment discrimination.
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| | Reply to Sunstein
Daniel B. Klein
Volume 1, Number 2, August 2004 Sunstein and Thaler concoct new meanings of "voluntary" and "coercive" as much as of "libertarian" and "paternalism." The bastardization “libertarian paternalism” upsets people’s understanding of those terms in their critical function: highlighting the coercive nature of government intervention. In espousing government intervention, Sunstein would advance honest discourse by admitting that it is coercive and defending it as such.
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